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We explore the role of expectations in second generation currency crisis models, proving
that sudden shifts in speculators’ beliefs can trigger currency devaluations, even without any
sizable worsening in the fundamentals. In our incomplete information game, mean-preserving
changes in speculators’ expectations may drive agents to a unique equilibrium with a self-
fullling attack. In particular, our model supports the thesis that 	 
,s i n c ea
sufciently large increase in speculators’ uncertainty over the fundamentals is likely to trigger
a currency crisis. Following a recent line of research, we also compare the results of private
and public information models and nd the following paradox: if speculators have private
information, the fact that the state of fundamentals is publicly revealed turns out to be more
advantageous to the government when fundamentals are bad.
JEL classication: F31, F33, D82.
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1
The nancial turmoil that hit East Asian countries in the summer of 1997 has revealed
the limits of theoretical models in explaining actual episodes of currency crises. According to
many accounts, the event that isconsidered the most likelycause of crisis (a denite worsening
in the fundamentals, possibly implied by an unsustainable economic policy) did not occur, at
least in some of the Asian economies struck by speculative attacks.
2 Thus, many economists
believe that other factors might have a crucial role in determining the dynamics of crisis.
In rst generation currency crisis models (FGMs), originally developed by Krugman
(1979) and Flood and Garber (1984), nancial crises follow a deterioration of the
fundamentals, typically due to inconsistent economic policies. By contrast, in second
generation models (SGMs), rst developed by Obstfeld (1994), attention turned to the
costs and benets of the xed exchange rate policy, stressing the importance of the trade-
off faced by the government between defending a xed currency peg and other policy
targets.
3 In these models, devaluation is a government’s optimal response to the actions
of speculators and it can take place as a result of self-fullling beliefs, without a previous
worsening in the fundamentals. Since speculative attacks raise the cost of defending a xed
exchange rate, SGMs may exhibit self-fullling multiple equilibria.
4 In SGMs the space of
fundamentals is usually divided into three regions: when fundamentals are “sound”,t h e r e
is a unique equilibrium in which the exchange rate is maintained (“good” equilibrium)
when fundamentals are 
, the currency depreciates when fundamentals fall in an
“intermediate” range (the “ripe for attack” zone), both outcomes are feasible.
4 We are very grateful to Matteo Bugamelli, Robert Flood, Olivier Jeanne, Francesco Lippi, Alessandro
Prati, Nicolas Sahuguet and Fabiano Schivardi for useful comments and helpful discussions. We also thank
an anonymous referee and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, at Georgetown University (1999 Southeast
International Economics Conference), at the University of Rome “Tor Vergata” (1999 Financial Conference), at
the University of Bonn (Center for European Integration Studies – ZEI) and at the VIII World Congress of the
Econometric Society for insightful suggestions. Massimo Sbracia acknowledges the IMF for the kind hospitality
in November 1999, when the paper was under revision. This paper does not necessarily reect the views of the
Bank of Italy or of the IMF. E-mail: m.sbracia@ashnet.it a.zaghini@poboxes.com
5 Corsetti et al. (1998) and Radelet and Sachs (1998) express different views of the causes of the Asian
crisis.
6 Economic policy targets that might conict with the defense of a xed currency peg include: achieving
a low level of unemployment, stimulating economic growth, reducing the scal burden, and supporting a sound
banking system. For an overview, see Obstfeld (1996).
7 For a discussion on the self-fullling feature of currency crises, see Obstfeld (1986 and 1994), Krugman
(1996) and the commentaries therein.8
In a recent paper, Morris and Shin (1998) started a promising line of analysis by
developing an SGM with incomplete information. They considered speculators having a
uniform prior probability distribution over the state of fundamentals that is updated according
to the observation of a private signal. Their model, as well as the earlier complete information
models, does not allow one to examine the role of the distribution of agents’ beliefs about the
fundamentals. This issue has been neglected in the literature, presumably because one could
think that only the mean of speculators’ probability assessment of the fundamentals matters in
an incomplete information framework. Hence, one could imagine that the equilibrium (or the
equilibria) of the game depends on the region where the mean of the probability distribution
falls. In such hypothetical case, the incomplete information framework would not enrich
the benchmark analysis and would not modify the structure of the equilibria. Nevertheless,
agents’ beliefs have often been used to explain actual currency crises. For instance, after the
Russian crisis many commentators pointed to an increase in agents’ uncertainty as a possible
explanation for the transmission of speculative pressures to other countries (especially in Latin
America) that had very limited trade linkages with Russia [see BIS (1999) and IMF (1999)].
Yet, typical SGMs do not explain why uncertainty should inuence speculative attacks.
In this paper we present two different variants of the incomplete information model
studied by Morris and Shin (1998). Our rst SGM allows us to study the role played by agents’
beliefs on the fundamentals. By explicitly introducing these beliefs, we nd that the mean of
the distribution of the fundamentals is not the sole relevant parameter. In particular, we show
that mean-preserving changes in speculators’ expectations can result in a shift from a model
with multiple equilibria to a model with a unique “attack” equilibrium. Our model differs
from Morris and Shin’s because it takes into account a generic prior probability distribution
and studies how equilibria change together with it. To focus on the effects of the uncertainty
of agents’ beliefs, we simplify the model by neglecting private information.
Our study supports the thesis that 	 
, since an increase in speculators’
uncertainty over the fundamentals is likely to trigger a currency crisis. It also offers some
interestinginsightsonthemultipleequilibriazoneofthecompleteinformationgame. Weshow
that when the mean of the distribution of agents’ beliefs falls in this region and uncertainty is
sufciently large, the incomplete information model has a unique equilibrium that entails a9
speculative attack. In other words, when the mean is in the “ripe for attack” zone, the “good”
equilibrium    to an increase in uncertainty.
In the second SGM presented in this paper, we analyze how public information affects
the structure of the equilibria. Along the lines of the global games study of Carlsson and
van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998) proved that removing the hypothesis of common
knowledge, which is implicit in their private information framework, determines a unique
equilibrium. Here, we develop a model in which agents observe the same public signal (so
that “some” common knowledge is restored) and we nd that multiple equilibria no longer
disappear.
Interestingly, by comparing the results of private and public information models, the
following paradox emerges: if speculators have private information, the fact that the state
of fundamentals is publicly revealed turns out to be more advantageous to the government
when fundamentals are bad! Examining the reasons behind this paradox provides some
useful insights on the likelihood of the events upon which equilibria rest. When the private
information model predicts an equilibrium with a currency attack, the public information
model’s equilibrium with no attack envisages an implausible (but still feasible) situation in
which speculators forego a big payoff that could have been obtained with a small coordination
effort. Analogously, when the private information model predicts an equilibrium with no
attack, the public information model’s equilibrium with a currency attack foresees speculators
getting a small payoff and requires a very large coordination effort. Hence, the comparison
highlights that equilibria discarded by the private information model but that re-emerge in the
public information framework seem hardly plausible. Therefore, the paradox warns that policy
conclusions drawn from models with multiple equilibria can be misleading, especially when
considerations on the likelihood of the outcomes are neglected.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briey reviews the benchmark
model with complete information. In Section 3, we analyze a basic incomplete information
framework where speculators’ expectations are represented by a generic prior probability
distribution and we study the consequences of changing its variance. In Section 4, we present
the model with public information, and we compare it with the private information model.
Section 5 concludes.10
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Inthissection, wepresent thesimplegame-theoreticformulation ofan SGM ofcomplete
informationproposedby Morris and Shin(1998). This model provides thestandard framework
on which we further develop the analysis of currency crises in the following sections.
Let us suppose that the economy is characterized by a state of fundamentals  that
can take values over the set ,w i t h  corresponding to a situation of “strong
fundamentals”. In the absence of government interventions, the “natural” (or shadow)
exchange rate is given by  ,w h e r e is a continuous and strictly increasing function.
5
The actual exchange rate is pegged by the government at a level W,w i t hW    for all
. A speculator can either  the currency (e.g., by short-selling one unit of it over the
exchange rate market) or  . If she attacks the currency and the government abandons
the peg, the speculator obtains the difference between the peg and the “natural” exchange rate,
free of the transaction cost: W      on the other hand, if the government successfully
defends the peg, the speculator ends up with a negative payoff (the transaction cost ). If the
speculator refrains from attacking, she gets . We assume that W      namely, in the
best state of fundamentals the “natural” exchange rate is sufciently close to the peg W so that
the prot resulting from a depreciation is outweighed by the transaction cost .
The government derives a value  by defending the peg, but he also faces
management costs. In particular, the cost of defending the peg is a function of the state of
fundamentals and of the share of speculators who attack the currency. We denote this cost
function by 	. Hence, if the government defends the peg when a proportion 
 of speculators
attacks the currency and the fundamentals are at the level , his payoff is   	
 if he
abandons the peg, we assume that his payoff is zero. The cost function is supposed to be
continuous, differentiable, increasing in 
 and decreasing in . Moreover, two hypotheses are
introduced to make the problem economically interesting: 	 and 	  .T h e
rst inequality states that in the worst state of fundamentals, the cost of defending the peg
exceeds the benet from maintaining it, even when no speculator attacks
6 the second states
8 The exchange rate is dened in terms of units of foreign currency per unit of national currency.
9 Recall that the main insight of SGMs concerns the trade-off faced by government between defending a
xed currency peg and other policy targets. It follows that the government may benet from abandoning the peg
even if nobody attacks, for a given range of fundamentals (see also Footnote 3).11
that when all speculators sell the currency, the cost of defending the peg exceeds the value ,
even in the best state of fundamentals.
Let us denote with  the value of the fundamentals that solves 	 i.e.,  is the
value of  at which, in the absence of any speculative selling, the government is indifferent
between defending the peg and abandoning it. When  , the government nds it protable
to abandon the peg even if no speculator attacks the currency. Similarly, we denote by   the
value that solves W   . Whenever  , speculators could force the government to
abandonthepeg, buttheywould getanegativepayofffromsuccessfullyattackingthecurrency.
Let us assume    .
7 The government, who knows the state of fundamentals , makes







,i f  	
  
,o t h e r w i s e 
In particular,   for any  in  and   for any  in .
Given , the solution of the reduced-form game of speculators allows us to classify the
soundness of the xed exchange rate by referring to the states of fundamentals:
 In the interval  fundamentals are such that the government’s cost of defending the
peg exceeds the value , even if no speculator attacks. In the reduced-form game, therefore,
the action  is strictly dominant for any agent and the peg is “unstable” since the currency
will depreciate.
 In the interval  , if all speculators attack the currency, the government’s cost of
defending the peg exceeds the value  and the currency depreciates on the other hand, if
no speculator attacks the currency, the government nds it protable to hold the peg, and
no devaluation occurs. This interval is usually referred to as the “ripe for attack” zone, to
underline the possibility of a positive gain from short-selling.
 In the interval   the “natural” exchange rate   is sufciently close to the peg
W, so that any prot resulting from a depreciation of the currency is offset by the transaction
: This assumption holds if  is “large” and  is “small”.
; We assume that when the government is indifferent, he chooses to abandon the peg.12
cost. Thus, in the reduced-form game, the action    is strictly dominant, the peg is
“stable” and no devaluation occurs.
The above tripartition of the state of fundamentals shows that there are two zones
in which a unique equilibrium exists (attack/devalue in the rst interval, and refrain from
attacking/defend the peg inthethirdone), and onezonein which thegamebetween speculators
and the government entails multiple equilibria. In the last case, speculators’ expectations are
self-fullling. In fact, consider the interval  . The government observes the choices of
his opponents and then decides whether to defend the peg. If speculators believe that the
currency will depreciate, their best action is to attack the peg. Although the government might
defend the peg successfully under a “limited” attack, when all agents sell the currency, the
government is forced to devalue, thereby conrming agents’ beliefs. On the other hand, if
speculators “feel” that the peg is going to be maintained, their best action would be to refrain
from attacking. This, inturn, allows thegovernment todefend the pegsuccessfully, conrming
again speculators’ beliefs.
The most important drawback of the existence of multiple equilibria is that they do not
allow for precise predictions of the game’s outcome. An interval of the fundamentals exists
for which an attack is possible, but one cannot say whether or when the attack will happen.
Note that the two equilibria in the “ripe for attack” zone (except for the unique value  )a r e
asymmetric: speculators can obtain a positive payoff by attacking the currency refraining
from attacking results in a null payoff.
The next two sections provide some extensions to this standard model by analyzing a
framework in which speculators are uncertain about the true .
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In this section we assume that speculators do not know the true state of fundamentals and
only have expectations in the form of a probability distribution over [0,1]. We also assume that
this distribution is common knowledge and that it is absolutely continuous with “full support”
over [0,1], and we denote its probability density function (p.d.f.) by 
. Such modication of
the original framework allows for a better understanding of the role of expectations in second
generation currency crisis models.13
Since  is not known when agents choose their actions, there cannot be multiple
equilibria in the sense of a complete information model (i.e. for a given value of ). Hence, we
can ask whether there are multiple equilibria for a given p.d.f. 
 over [0,1]. It is a simple task
to verify that multiple equilibria are still possible
9 nevertheless, by studying the conditions
that must be fullled by 
 in order to have a model with multiple equilibria, we can gain some
important insights into the effects of speculators’ expectations.
The government’s optimal strategy is the same function  as in the complete information
game. Given , we can determine the expected payoff of a generic speculator. It is enough to
verify that:
 if speculator  refrains from attacking, she obtains a  payoff, no matter what the other
speculators do













since, for any level of , an attack by all speculators forces the government to abandon the
peg
10











since the government abandons the peg in the interval  and maintains it in the interval
.
Let us denote integral (1) by ￿ 3￿ and expression (2) by ￿ 3￿. The strategy
prole in which all agents attack the currency is an equilibrium  ￿ 3￿   the strategy
prole in which all agents refrain from attacking is an equilibrium  ￿ 3￿  .L e t




, agents knowwith certainty that  is in the interval
with multiple equilibria and they can coordinate their actions either on the “good” or on the “bad” equilibrium.
43 We have denoted by   the random variable which represents the distribution of the state of fundamentals
and takes values over  with p.d.f. .14
be the probability that the state of fundamentals is not greater than . We can refer to  as the
probability of an “unforced” currency depreciation because the government devalues even if

  . The necessary and sufcient conditions for the  equilibrium and for the  
















  	  

    . (4)
It is easy to show that, since ￿ 3￿  ￿ 3￿,
11 speculators’ choices of attacking
the currency are strategic complements. Hence, since both ￿ 3￿   and ￿ 3￿  
may hold for the same 
 three situations can be identied:
 if ￿ 3￿   (that implies ￿ 3￿  ), there is only one equilibrium: all
speculators attack the currency and the government abandons the peg
 if ￿ 3￿   (that implies ￿ 3￿  ), there is only one equilibrium:
all speculators refrain from attacking the currency and the government either abandons or
maintains the peg, depending on   or   
 if ￿ 3￿   and ￿ 3￿   there are multiple equilibria: agents may either
attack the currency (and force a devaluation) or refrain from attacking (so that the peg is
maintained, provided that   ).
We focus on the situation with multiple equilibria. After some simple algebra, it can be























Let us denote the above interval by   ￿ 2. We can verify that the condition
W   is a reasonable requirement for multiple equilibria. When the level of the peg W is
“high” (i.e. W  2), speculators expect a large payoff from a successful attack hence, the
strategy prole where agents refrain from attacking is discarded and the unique equilibrium of










the model entails massive speculative pressures. On the other hand, if W is “low” (W  ￿),
speculators expect a negative payoff from a successful attack and the unique equilibrium of
the model predicts that speculators do not attack the currency. For “intermediate” levels of W,
both outcomes are equilibria of the game.
We can obtain a simple necessary condition for multiple equilibria, by requiring that 
















  	  
   (5)
where, clearly,   .
Condition (5) can be used, together with conditions (3) and (4), to highlight the
perturbations of the probability distribution over the fundamentals that remove the multiplicity
of the equilibria. By looking at conditions (3) and (4), one realizes that changes in agents’













  	  

or . In general, when 
 changes, all these
values may also change. However, to simplify the discussion and to better understand of the














  	  

 w and recall the denitions of  and
 analogously, denote the corresponding parameters computed with a different p.d.f. 
￿ by ￿,
￿
w, ￿ and ￿. Let us assume that an initial p.d.f. 
 entails multiple equilibria. Consider, rst,
an increase of .S p e c i cally, suppose that speculators’ beliefs change from 
 to a new p.d.f.

￿ on , such that ￿  , ￿
w  w, and the expected exchange rate increases to a level
￿   which makes ￿  ￿. Under the new beliefs 
￿ there cannot be multiple equilibria and,
checking that condition (3) does not hold, we nd that the “good” equilibrium where agents
do not attack is the game’s unique equilibrium. This is not surprising since an increase in 
corresponds to an improvement in the fundamentals of the economy and implies that the peg is
believed to be closer to its “natural” level than under 
. If the increase in  is sufciently large,
the expected gain to speculators from a successful attack (given by W   )i sn e g a t i v e  the
“bad” equilibrium is therefore discarded.16
Second, let us consider a different perturbation of 
, in which the new p.d.f. 
￿ on 
is such that ￿  , ￿  , and the expected exchange rate conditioned on  	   decreases
to a level ￿
w  w so that  ￿. Since condition (5) does not hold, there cannot be multiple
equilibria. Checking that condition (4) is no longer fullled, we see that the game’s unique
equilibrium is the strategy prole in which all agents attack the currency. Although under the
new beliefs 
￿ the expected overvaluation of the peg with respect to the “natural” exchange
rate does not change, the decrease in w creates a better situation for agents: if the state of
fundamentals is in the attack zone, speculators’ payoffs from selling the currency increase. In
particular, if ￿
w is sufciently less than w, the utility from attacking when all others refrain,
￿ 3￿, becomes positive. Hence, with 
￿ any agent expects a positive gain by selling the
currency, even when she is the only speculator doing so. It follows that any agent has an
incentive to attack, and the “bad” equilibrium becomes the game’s unique equilibrium.
Lastly, we can consider a new p.d.f. 
￿ on  such that ￿  , ￿
w  w, and the
probability that the state of fundamentals is in the attack zone increases to ￿  . Similar
to the previous case, under the new beliefs 
￿ the game has a unique equilibrium in which
all agents sell the currency, although the expected appreciation of the exchange rate has not
changed. The increase in , meaning that some probability has shifted towards the left tail
of the distribution, makes ￿ 3￿  . Hence, under 
￿ each agent believes that she can
achieve a positive payoff even if she is alone in attacking the currency the “bad” equilibrium
becomes the game’s unique equilibrium.
The previous discussion shows that changes in speculators’ expectations that do not
imply a worsening in the perceived overvaluation of the peg may be sufcient to induce a
speculative attack. In particular, a modication of speculators’ beliefs such that the mean is
preserved but the dispersion of the distribution increases may imply a switch from a multiple
equilibria game to one with a unique “bad” equilibrium. In fact, an increase, say, in the
variance of the distribution may imply a corresponding increase in  (which is the probability
of the left tail of the distribution) and, by the mechanism highlighted above, it may trigger a
speculative attack. This feature of the model can be used to shed some light on the aftermath
of the Russian crisis, when many commentators pointed to an increase in agents’ uncertainty
as a likely explanation for the transmission of strong speculative pressures to several emerging17
market economies. In order to further highlight increased uncertainty as a possible cause of
currency crises, we present a simple discrete example.
Assume that fundamentals can only take three values:  	 ￿ 2 ￿
 with ￿  2 
￿. Suppose that the parameters are such that: when   ￿ the government devalues the
currency even if no speculator attacks when   2 there are multiple equilibria when   ￿
no speculator attacks and the peg is maintained. Specically, we need to assume:

W  ￿  

W  2  
  	 ￿  
  	 2  
Let us keep the symbol 
 to denote the probability distribution over the state of
fundamentals and denote (consistent with the previous notation)    	￿ and
   	￿,w i t h   and  
 . The necessary and sufcient conditions
to achieve an equilibrium with a speculative attack and an equilibrium without a speculative
attack are conditions (3) and (4), respectively. The necessary condition for multiple equilibria












Consider an economy characterized by parameter levels such that the inequalities (3),
(4) and (6) hold and where agents coordinate their choices so that they refrain from attacking
(“good” equilibrium). If speculators revise their expectations to a p.d.f. 
￿ with a higher
probability of an “unforced” devaluation of the currency (so that (4) and (6) no longer hold),
they trigger the attack that forces the government to abandon the peg. We have already shown
that the updated p.d.f. 
￿ can preserve the samemean as 
. Indeed, inthis simple example there
are many probability density functions that preserve the same mean as 
 and have a higher 
all of them are characterized by an increase in the  of the speculators’ expectations. In
fact, in order to maintain a constant mean,  and  must both increase. Hence, in this example
the currency attack is triggered by an increase in theuncertainty over the stateof fundamentals.18
Finally, let us come back to the general case and suppose that  is an afne
transformation. In Section 2, we determined a tripartition of the space of fundamentals relative
to the complete information model. Now we can check whether a similar partition for the
parameterspaceofthemeanofthe distributionoverthefundamentalsexists. It iseasytoverify
that the condition  	   is necessary and sufcient for an equilibrium with a speculative
attack, for any p.d.f. representing agents’ beliefs. However, under a generic p.d.f., one cannot
nd a necessary and sufcient condition for the “good” equilibrium that depends only on the
mean of the distribution.
12 Instead, one can nd a sufcient condition:  	   implies that
the “good” strategy prole is the unique equilibrium of the game. However, “good” equilibria
can also hold when  	  . From these results, a particular kind of source of instability
follows. Suppose that  	 is in the “ripe for attack zone” of the corresponding complete
information game (i.e.,    	  ). If  is sufciently large or if w is sufciently
small, the strategy prole with no attack is not an equilibrium the only feasible outcome
is the equilibrium with a devaluation of the currency. Therefore, even when the mean of
the distribution over the fundamentals falls in a region that would yield multiple equilibria
within a complete information model (and, thus, where agents could refrain from attacking the
currency and allow the peg to be maintained), in the incomplete information case there might
be a unique equilibrium with a speculative attack, depending on the degree of dispersion of the
probability distribution representing speculators’ beliefs.
13 In other words, when  	  
“good” equilibria tend to be not robust to an increase in uncertainty.
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Morris and Shin (1998)have developed a different incomplete information version ofthe
simple model outlined in Section 2. In a framework where agents do not know the true state of
fundamentals and only have imperfect private information, Morris and Shin show that a unique
equilibrium exists for each state of fundamentals. Theirmodel highlights the importance ofthe
removal of the 

 
 hypothesis to obtain the result. In fact, along the lines of
Carlsson and van Damme (1993), the uniqueness of the equilibrium is not the consequence of
45 In fact, condition (4) shows that the “good” equilibrium depends on parameters of the p.d.f. other than the
mean. With special probability distributions, however, one can nd conditions for the “good” equilibrium that
depend only the mean.
46 Note that for many classes of p.d.f. — when  is constant — both an increase in 
 and a decrease in ￿ are
associated with an increase in the variance of the distribution.19
uncertainty on the state of fundamentals   rather, it follows from each agent’s uncertainty
on the other players’ actions that occurs in equilibrium, due to the impossibility of precisely
establishing the information received by them. In other words, the uniqueness of the equilibria
is not produced by removing the hypothesis of common knowledge of the fundamentals.
Instead, the result is a consequence of the removal of the hypothesis of common knowledge of
each player’s action that takes place in equilibrium when players have private information.
In this section we compare Morris and Shin’s results with our results achieved with a
public information model i.e., with a model in which each player has access to the same
imperfect publicsignal. Weshowthatinany equilibriumofthismodelthecommonknowledge
of agents’ actions is restored, although the lack of common knowledge of fundamentals is
preserved. Consistent with Morris and Shin, we nd that the public information model has
multiple equilibria and that the borders of the multiple equilibria region are “close” to those of
the “ripe for attack” zone of the complete information game.
Let us briey recall the private information setup. With respect to the model presented
in the previous section, Morris and Shin consider a specic prior probability distribution 
,
given by the uniform p.d.f. over . They also assume that each agent  observes a signal ￿
uniformly and independently (conditional to ) drawn from the interval    
 ,w h e r e
is a small positive number.
14 The game is structured as follows: (a) Nature chooses the state
of fundamentals  according to a uniform p.d.f. over  (b) speculators observe their signal
￿ and decide simultaneously whether to attack the currency or to refrain from attacking (c)
the government, who knows the true state , observes the share of speculators attacking the
currency and then decides whether to defend the peg or to abandon it, allowing a devaluation
of the currency to its “natural” level  .
Within this framework, it is possible to prove the following theorem:
"#  .   
" / 0012: There is a unique level 
W of the
fundamentals such that, in any equilibrium of the game with imperfect private
47 Heinemann and Illing (1999) provide a generalization of Morris and Shin’s setup: their model shows that
the uniqueness of the equilibrium also holds with more general probability distributions.20
information, the government abandons the currency peg    
W.
In order to understand why multiple equilibria are ruled out, a feature of the private
information model has to be considered: it is never 

 
 that fundamentals are
in a particular region. This can be explained by considering different   
.






player may receive a private signal that makes her sure that f is within the “ripe for attack”
zone. Given f, messages are distributed over f  f 
 . Suppose that player  receives
the message ￿  f 
 . Such agent believes that   ￿  ￿ 
 . If this interval is
inside  , agent  realizes that the state of fundamentals is in the “ripe for attack” zone.
However, she cannot conclude that her opponents also know that  is in that region. In fact,
agent  knows that if   ￿ 
  there may be an agent, say agent , who receives a message
2  ￿ 
 . In this case, agent  knows that agent  believes that   2  2 
 .I n
particular, agent  knows that agent  thinks that if   2 
, there is an agent, call her agent
, who receives a message, ￿  2 
  (i.e. ￿  ￿ 

 ). By iterating this argument, one
realizes that it is never common knowledge that  is in the “ripe for attack” zone.
This argument is relevant to understanding why multiple equilibria are discarded. When
   , computing the optimal action requires that agents know the others’ actions. In the
complete information framework, agents know that they can coordinate on  or on  
. Since in equilibrium the actions chosen are common knowledge, both the “good” and
the “bad”strategy prolescanbeequilibriaofthe game. By contrast, in theprivateinformation
model, it is assumed that in equilibrium there is common knowledge of  
	 ,
where a strategy for any agent  is a function ￿  ￿  	  
, ￿  .
If there are two regions of ￿ where the equilibrium strategy of agent  induces her to select
two different actions,
15 there cannot be common knowledge of the action chosen by this agent
because, as previously discussed, there is never common knowledge of the region where  is
(and, thus, of the region where ￿ is). In computing the potential gains and losses that follow
the choice of attacking, for any feasible message ￿ the lack of common knowledge forces
48 In the currency crisis game it is certain that agents act differently in different regions in , 





   strictly dominates  (Section 2). Such regions
are called 
 .M o r r i s  (1995) apply a similar argument to more general games (for which

  regions do not exist) by introducing the concept of 
.21
speculators to try to assess of the average behavior of the others. Such computations yield a
unique optimal action for any message ￿ and, therefore, a unique equilibrium.
We now consider a model where any agent receives the same public message  
  , which we assume to be uniformly drawn from the interval    
  .
Such hypothesis maintains some uncertainty over  but restores the common knowledge of
speculators’ actions. In fact, since a strategy for any agent  is a function ￿   
	  
 and since in equilibrium there is common knowledge of the strategy
prole 	￿ 
, common knowledge of  implies common knowledge of the actions
￿ chosen.
16 In the public information model, the following theorem holds:
"# !:L e t  

   


. There exists a subset !  "￿" 2  ,
with "￿  
   and "2      
  , such that if   !, the game
with imperfect public information has multiple equilibria.
The proof of the theorem shows that the existence of multiple equilibria is entirely
dependent on the assumption of common knowledge of the players’ actions. We provide a
sketch of the proof here, setting forth the more technical aspects in the Appendix. First of all,
we determine the optimal strategy of the government in the last stage of the game. Then, we
build two different strategy proles and we verify that they are both equilibria of the game.
Let #  be the smallest share of speculators that, by attacking, induce the government
to abandon the peg. Of course, # when    and # is such that 	#   
when   . One can easily verify that: (i) #   (ii) # is a continuous function of  (iii)
#








#  for any   .
Given the optimal strategy of the government, we can solve the reduced-form game
played by the speculators. Depending on the public message observed, we can identify three
cases:
49 In the case of 
 
, that we neglect, the knowledge of  implies knowledge of the 	
 under which actions are chosen.
4: This function coincides with the function  used in the previous sections.22
 if   , agents are certain that   




     

, agents are certain that     
 if  





We build two different equilibria. In the rst equilibrium () agents use a strategy .￿
suchthat .￿  if    , .￿    if   
 ,a n d.￿ must
be determined for      
  . In the second equilibrium () agents use a strategy
.2 such that .2   if      , .2    if     
  and .2 
must be determined for  






It is easy to verify that no speculator has an incentive to deviate from .￿ when all the
others are following the same strategy, at least for the values of .￿ that we have specied.
T h es a m ea p p l i e st o.2. The determination of .￿ when      
   and of
.2 when  


    
  

is rather technical and the proof is presented separately in the
Appendix. However, the intuition is straightforward. In the rst equilibrium, the utility from
attacking when       is strictly positive it is strictly negative when    
  .I nt h e
Appendix we show that there is a unique message ￿ such that, when received, the utility from
attacking is equal to zero. Analogously, in the second equilibrium, the utility from attacking
is strictly positive when       , it is strictly negative when     
  , and we prove in the
Appendix that there is a unique message 2 such that the utility from attacking is equal to zero.
The two signals￿ and 2 are the two switching points ofthe agents’ optimal cut-off strategies.
From ￿ we obtain the unique level of the fundamentals, "￿, such that in the equilibrium 
the currency depreciates    "￿. Similarly, from 2 we obtain the unique level of the
fundamentals, "2, such that in the equilibrium  the currency depreciates    "2.I n
this way we nd an interval !  "￿" 2 where the currency may or may not be maintained,
depending on whether agents coordinate at  or .
We can nallycomparetheresultsoftheprivateand thepublicinformationmodel. Byan
inspection of the graphical argument proposed by Morris and Shin, one realizes that in general

W    
. However, it is easy to x parameter values for which 
W  !.T h e
previous modelshaveshown thatifthetruestate of fundamentals is in"￿
Wandagents only
have private information, a speculative attack is triggered that forces a currency devaluation.
Instead, for the same levels of , if the true state of fundamentals is publicly revealed, multiple23
equilibria are restored and there is “hope” that the currency will not depreciate because agents
may coordinate on the “good” equilibrium with no attack.
18 Now suppose that  is in 
W" 2.
If agents only have private information there is no speculative attack on the other hand, if  is
publicly revealed, a speculative attack may occur (because agents may coordinate on the “bad”
equilibrium). Hence, providing public information turns out to be more advantageous to the
government when fundamentals are “fairly bad” (i.e. in "￿
W) than when fundamentals are










This paradox may be explained by a precise comparison of the private and the public
informationmodels, whichtakesintoaccountthe“amountofcoordination”requiredtoachieve
the higher-payoff equilibrium and the “size” of this payoff. This comparison sheds light on
the likelihood of the outcomes in the case of multiple equilibria. In the multiple equilibria
region, the equilibrium with a coordinated currency attack always yields the highest payoff for
speculators. Hence, in order to compare different equilibria for the same state of fundamentals,
we can consider the “amount of coordination” required to achieve the highest payoff and the
“size” of this payoff.
4; This also holds if a noisy public signal is sent, as long as 
 is sufciently smaller then . In particular, it is
easy to check that it holds if 
 	 .
4< In general, we can also say that providing public information seems to be more advantageous when funda-
mentals are “bad” (i.e. when 
￿) than when fundamentals are “good” (i.e. when 	
￿). In fact, if 
￿  4
(
￿ 	 5), providing public information does not make any difference because the peg is abandoned (main-
tained) in any case. Note that the paradox exists as long as 
￿  . In fact, if 
￿ 	 5 (
￿ 	 4),
providing public information is always (never) advantageous.24
When fundamentals are “good”, speculators holding only private information do not
attack the currency because their expected gain from a successful attack is “small” and the
“amount of coordination” required to get that payoff is “high” (the share of attackers needed
to force the government to abandon the peg is high) this makes their expected payoff less
than zero. The availability of public information eliminates the uncertainty over the others and
offers speculators the opportunity to coordinate on the “bad” equilibrium and obtain also that
small positive payoff. However, it does not seem very likely that speculators will succeed in
achieving a high “amount of coordination” just to obtain a small payoff.
On the other hand, when fundamentals are “fairly bad”, speculators’ payoff from a
successful attack increases and the “coordination effort” required to achieve that payoff
decreases. Hence, speculators holding only private information attack the currency because,
given that a small “coordination effort” is sufcient to get a high payoff, they think it is likely
that the others will attack too. With public information they could refrain from attacking.
However, this event does not seem very likely because it entails speculators wasting a large
payoff that could be gained easily.
20
This result can be compared with the comparative statics exercise in Heinemann and
Illing (1999). Building on Morris and Shin’s private information model, Heinemann and Illing
show that a decline in $ makes 
W decrease. According to the authors, a government could
reduce$bycommitting to amoretransparenteconomicpolicy. Hence, theystatethatincreased
transparency in a government’s economic policy reduces the likelihood of a currency attack.
With respect to our model, this nding suggests that when a government’s economic policy is
transparent, the region "￿
W - where the policy-maker would nd it convenient that public
information is released - is smaller. Thus, committing to a more transparent economic policy
seems to reduce the benets from a strategic use of public information.
An interesting extension of the present study would be a more detailed examination of
the strategic use of public information. This analysis should take into account the possibility
that the government nds it protable to release biased information, and it is potentially
complicated by the presence of multiple equilibria (that re-emerge as $ goes to zero or as
precise public information are explicitly considered, as in our model). The exploration of this
53 Note that a similar comparison can be made between the results of complete and private information
models too.25
issue is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, it could be an important development
of the SGMs. It could also provide the correct theoretical tool for the evaluation of the
benets from adherence to programs such as the Special Data Dissemination Standard of the
International Monetary Fund [see IMF(1999)].
3 % 
The game-theoretic approach of SGMs has proven to be an important line of research
for the investigation of the role of speculators’ expectations and information in the onset of
currency crises. A promising line of analysis is offered by the study of global games, initiated
by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and applied to speculative attacks by Fukao (1994) and
to second generation currency crisis models by Morris and Shin (1998). Theoretically, global
games show the importance of the hypothesis of common knowledge of agents’ actions for
multiple equilibria and give some insights into the likelihood of the equilibria of complete and
public information games.
The results achieved in the paper are consistent with this theory. In fact, with public
information, the reintroduction of the common knowledge of agents’ actions that occurs in
equilibrium (still maintaining some uncertainty over the fundamentals) leads us to show that a
multiple equilibria zone exists. Moreover, a comparison of the results of the public and private
information models highlights an interesting paradox: when agents have private information,
the fact that the state of fundamentals is publicly revealed turns out to be more advantageous
to the government when fundamentals are bad than when fundamentals are “good”!H o w e v e r ,
it is apparent that this happens because the equilibria of the public information model that are
eliminated in the private information game depend on the occurrence of implausible events
e.g., obtaining a small payoff with a large amount of coordination or renouncing a big payoff
that could have been achieved with a small amount of coordination.
Our example shows that it is easy to draw misleading conclusions from models with
multiple equilibria, especially when consideration of the likelihood of outcomes is neglected.
Hence, the paradox calls for an equilibrium selection procedure because, with multiple
equilibria, gametheory can bea “weak and uninformative theory” [Harsany and Selten (1988)]
and it can also lead to implementing erroneous policies. Global games, which lead to a unique
equilibrium in a wide class of models, can be a very powerful tool in this regard.26
By focusing on speculators’ expectations, we prove that mean-preserving changes in
speculators’ probability assessments of the state of fundamentals may be sufcient to drive
agents to a unique “bad” equilibrium with a self-fullling currency attack. Hence, the
model suggests an explanation for sudden shifts in speculators’ behavior that trigger currency
devaluations that do not seem to be justied by the fundamentals. In fact, modications of
agents’ beliefs that induce speculative attacks can occur even without a worsening in the
expected state of fundamentals. In particular, the model demonstrates that a crisis can be
triggered by an increase in 	 over the fundamentals (as measured, for example, by
the variance of the distribution) or, in general, by an increase in the subjective probability of
an “unforced” currency devaluation.
Finally, by assuming an afne relationship between the “natural” exchange rate and the
fundamentals, we prove that a mean-preserving change in beliefs that induces a shift to a
unique equilibrium with a currency crisis may occur when the expected state of fundamentals
is in the “ripe for attack” zone. Therefore, the model shows that the “good” equilibrium  
 to changes in agents’ beliefs for example due to an increase in uncertainty. Note that
in a complete information model, when an economy’s fundamentals fall the “ripe for attack”
zone, the economy is  to a currency attack because speculators may or may not
trigger a crisis. Our incomplete information model instead suggests that such an economy
should be considered as 
 as it is in the “unstable” zone. In fact, for some (unbiased)
agents’ expectations, there may be a unique “bad” equilibrium with a speculative attack and a
devaluation of the currency.$$ +( & & "# !
The proof of Theorem 2 can be completed by using “locally”–i.e. over the intervals
   
   and


    
  

– the method applied by Morris and Shin in their private
informationmodel. However, ourproofcan besimplied sincewearenotinterestedinproving
the uniqueness of the different equilibria for each state of fundamentals. Moreover, the public
information framework allows us to eliminate any ambiguity in agents’ beliefs since agents
receive exactly the same public message , when they use the same decision rule they choose
also the same actions. Hence, their belief about the share of attackers is always either 0 or 1
and, in equilibrium, coincides with the agents’ actual behavior.
21 The proof is in ve steps and
makes use of a lemma that we prove separately in the fourth step.
. 
F oranygi v enstrate gyproleofspeculators, let%bethespeculators’beliefsaboutthe
share of attackers when the public message is . These beliefs are determined in equilibrium
and must be consistent with speculators’ equilibrium strategies. Given , the actual share of
attackers depends on % (because of the consistency condition) and on the stochastic realization
. Hence, let 
% be the expected share of attackers given  and %. Since messages are
uniformly distributed on    









Let &%	  
%  #
.W h e n  &%, agents expect that the currency will
be depreciated. Hence, the payoff for an agent who attacks when the state of fundamentals is
 and her belief is % may be written as:
'@%

W    ,

if   &%
if   &% .
54 In a private information model, agents’ actual choices can be diverse because agents can receive different
messages. However, MorrisandShinassumethat agents’beliefs about the “aggregateselling strategy”are always
0 or 1, even if, in equilibrium, the actual share can fall whithin the unit interval.28
However, when agents decide whether to attack, they do not know  and they only
observe the public message . Hence, the expected payoff from attacking the currency when












W    ,
where
(%  &%     
  




Let us consider a symmetric equilibrium (all speculators use the same strategy). Since
speculators receive the same public message, in equilibrium we have %
 @% 
 and %
 @%  .
22 We also consider equilibria where speculators’ strategies







if   ) .






if   ) .
We now make use of a lemma demonstrated by Morris and Shin (1998). For ease of
the reader, in the following step we report the lemma and its proof (corrected for a minor
imperfection), with a notation consistent with the previous steps
2 

3 (  @ )*&  	 
    )
55 We assume that speculators refrain from attacking whenever they are indifferent.
56 In the general framework of global games, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) prove that a cut-off rule is the
unique optimal strategy.29
Consider the function 
*&, which represents the expected share of attackers when













if   )   











Recall that when 
  # the currency depreciates. Observe that +)  if )     ,
and  + )  if )  .








Since the government abandons the peg only if  lies in the interval )
 +),t h e








W    .( A 3 )
By hypothesis, W    is strictly decreasing in . Therefore, to prove that @ )*&
is strictly decreasing in ) it is enough to show that +) is non increasing.









57 Note that if   
 there is a unique value of  such that (A1) holds this is not true if 
.T h u s ,
here we depart from Morris and Shin’sd e nitions, make them more accurate. In particular, we dene  as “
the  value of  such that (A1) holds”, so that we can deal with a function and not with a correspondence.
58 It is indifferent to take the minimum or the maximum of  such that (A1) holds because 	￿
between those values. Therefore, a different denition of  would not change the value of the integral (A3).30
Hence, +
￿ )  ,w h i c hi ss u f cient to prove the strict monotonicity of @. Finally,
continuity follows from the fact that @ is an integral in which the limits of integration are
themselves continuous in ).
 	

Finally we can turn to the two equilibria  and  dened in Section 4. Consider the
equilibrium  where agents attack if       and do not attack if    
  .O fc o u r s e ,
@ * w3B   and @
 * wnB  . Hence, from the lemma, it follows that there exists
a unique value ￿     







if   ￿
.
With a simple graphic argument it is easy to show that there is a unique value of the
fundamentals "￿  
   such that if   "￿ the currency depreciates and if " ￿
the peg is maintained.
Analogously, in the equilibrium  where agents attack if       and do not attack
if   
 ,s i n c e@ * w3B   and @
 * wnB  , from the lemma it follows that
there exists a unique value 2 


    
  








if   2
.
Hence, we infer that there is a unique value of the fundamentals "2     
  
such that if   "2 the currency depreciates and if " 2 the peg is maintained.
Thus, we have found an interval !  "￿" 2 where the currency may or may not be
maintained depending on whether agents coordinate on  or . The proof is completed by






, ! is not empty.
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